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VOLUME 62 NO. 5, 2021
MARRIAGE EQUALITY’S LESSONS FOR SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR.*
ABSTRACT
The marriage equality movement won its first state victory in
2003, and within a dozen years fifty states were handing out
marriage licenses. The swiftness of the constitutional triumph was
only possible because public opinion underwent a sea change in that
period. Sexual and gender minorities achieved this remarkable turn-
around once a critical mass, widely dispersed in the country, came
out of their closets as committed couples (often raising children), and
mainstream America found their stories more consistent with their
own lives than they did a generation earlier. Other lessons of
marriage equality’s success, however, are how hard it is for a social
movement to change longstanding norms and perspectives and how
prejudice and stereotyping survive court victories and migrate to
other issues and social groups.
* John A. Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. An earlier version of this
Article was presented in October 2019 at the Cutler Lecture at William & Mary Law School.
I appreciate the comments from the dean, faculty, and students during and after that
presentation.
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I. THE SWIFT VICTORY OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY
In 1967, the Supreme Court ruled in Loving v. Virginia that
states could not constitutionally deny different-race couples the
right to marry.1 The same year, Thea Spyer proposed marriage to
Edie Windsor, but neither expected their lifetime commitment to be
recognized by the state the way Virginia had to recognize the
marriage of Mildred Jeter and Richard Loving.2 Also in 1967, Jack
Baker proposed to Mike McConnell, who insisted that he wanted a
real marriage, recognized by the state.3 So Jack enrolled in law
school two years later, learned about marriage laws, and filed a
lawsuit demanding constitutional recognition of their right to
marry.4 Every judge to hear their case, and others like it in the
1970s, felt that Loving had no connection to relationships between
“homosexuals.”5
In 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court found the analogy to Loving
persuasive. In Baehr v. Lewin, the court ruled that denying a
woman (Ninia Baehr) the right to marry another woman (Genora
Dancel) was discrimination because of sex, for the same reason that
denying a Black woman (Jeter) the right to marry a white man
(Loving) was discrimination because of race.6 On remand, the
state trial court found that Hawaii could offer no reasonable justi-
fication for the discrimination,7 but the voters amended the state
constitution before the state supreme court could confirm that
1. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
2. Robert D. McFadden, Edith Windsor, Whose Same-Sex Marriage Fight Led to
Landmark Ruling, Dies at 88, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/
12/us/edith-windsor-dead-same-sex-marriage-doma.html [https://perma.cc/2JT5-2H48].
3. MICHAEL MCCONNELL WITH JACK BAKER AS TOLD TO GAIL LANGER KARWOSKI, THE
WEDDING HEARD ‘ROUND THE WORLD: AMERICA’S FIRST GAY MARRIAGE 21-22 (2016).
4. Id. at 47, 65-66, 95-98.
5. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1972); see also Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589-90 (Ky. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 522
P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
6. 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (reviewing the Court’s reasoning in holding that
Virginia’s miscegenation statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment and observing that
“[s]ubstitution of ‘sex’ for ‘race’ and article I, section 5 [of the Hawaii Constitution] for the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment yields the precise case before us together with the conclusion we
have reached”), reaff’d and clarified, 852 P.2d 74 (Haw. 1993). 
7. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21-22 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). 
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holding.8 It was not until November 2003 that any American juris-
diction officially extended civil marriage to same-sex couples, thanks
to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Good-
ridge v. Department of Public Health.9 Because the mandate did not
take effect for six months, the Commonwealth issued the first
licenses on May 17, 2004.10 As Figure 1 below reveals, three other
states recognized same-sex unions but not same-sex marriages.11
Figure 1. Recogniton of Same-Sex Marriages or Unions, May 2004
8. See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (giving the legislature authority to restrict marriage to
different-sex couples); Baehr v. Miike, 92 Haw. 634 (1999) (summarily reversing judgment for
same-sex couples based on state constitutional amendment).
9. 798 N.E.2d 941, 968-69 (Mass. 2003), aff’d by Opinions of the Justices to the Senate,
802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004). 
10. See Mary L. Bonauto, Goodridge in Context, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 44 (2005).
11. See California Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003, ch. 421, 2003
Cal. Stat. 3081 (providing comprehensive domestic partnership rights); Act of July 8, 1997,
Act 383, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 1211 (providing for reciprocal beneficiaries, with three dozen
rights and benefits of marriage); Act of Apr. 26, 2000, no. 91, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72
(providing for comprehensive civil unions). 
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By the time President Barack Obama was inaugurated in Jan-
uary 2009, only Connecticut had joined Massachusetts as a mar-
riage equality jurisdiction,12 though nine states and the District of
Columbia recognized civil unions, domestic partnerships, or recip-
rocal beneficiaries for same-sex couples.13 Between January 2009
and January 2015, the marriage equality map exploded, from two
states to thirty-five states and the District of Columbia.14
Figure 2. Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, January 2015
12. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 480-82 (Conn. 2008). 
13. In addition to the three states in note 11, see also Omnibus Domestic Partnership
Equality Amendment Act of 2008, D.C. Act 17-403, 55 D.C. Reg. 6758 (June 6, 2008)
(providing comprehensive domestic partnership rights); Act to Promote the Financial Security
of Maine’s Families and Children, ch. 672, 2004 Me. Laws 2126 (some domestic partnership
rights); Act of May 22, 2008, ch. 590, 2008 Md. Laws 4597 (some domestic partnership rights);
Act of May 31, 2007, ch. 58, 2007 N.H. Laws 57 (civil unions); Act of Dec. 20, 2006, ch. 103,
2006 N.J. Laws 975 (civil unions); Oregon Family Fairness Act, ch. 99, 2007 Or. Laws 425
(comprehensive domestic partnership rights); Act of Apr. 20, 2007, ch. 156, 2007 Wash. Sess.
Laws 616 (some domestic partnership rights). 
14. Figure 2 is based upon WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & CHRISTOPHER R. RIANO, MARRIAGE
EQUALITY: FROM OUTLAWS TO IN-LAWS app. 1, at 755-71 (2020) (listing the date for every
state’s recognition of same-sex marriages).
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 Figure 2 above reveals the path taken by each of those thirty-five
states toward recognition of the freedom to marry for LGBTQ+
Americans. Notice that only five states secured marriage equality
through state supreme court decisions interpreting state constitu-
tions.15 More than double that number—eleven states and the
District of Columbia—recognized marriage equality by statutes or
a voter initiative adopted between March 2009 (Vermont) and
November 2013 (Illinois).16 Between June 2013 and January 2015,
a whopping nineteen states flipped after federal court orders: Cal-
ifornia when the Supreme Court in Hollingsworth v. Perry dismiss-
ed the appeal of a federal injunction,17 and the other eighteen states
after the Court (on the same day) sustained Edie Windsor’s chal-
lenge to federal marriage exclusions.18 By the time the Supreme
Court granted review for the six lawsuits consolidated as Obergefell
v. Hodges in January 2015, the marriage equality map included
thirty-five states and the District of Columbia.19 There were only
fifteen states resisting—about the same number and mostly the
same states whose different-race marriage exclusions fell in Loving
v. Virginia.20
15. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 480-82; Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Garden
State Equal. v. Dow, 92 A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865, 872 (N.M. 2013).
16. Act of May 7, 2013, ch. 19, 79 Del. Laws 1; Jury and Marriage Amendment Act of
2009, D.C. Act 18-70, 56 D.C. Reg. 3797 (May 6, 2009); Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013,
Act 1, 2013 Haw. Sess. Laws 1; Religious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act, Pub. Act 98-
0597, 2013 Ill. Laws 7141; Civil Marriage Protection Act, ch. 2, 2012 Md. Laws 9 (ratified by
voters, 2012); Act of May 14, 2013, ch. 74, 2013 Minn. Laws 404; Act of June 3, 2009, ch. 59,
2009 N.H. Laws 60; Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, 2011 N.Y. Laws 749; Act of May 2, 2013,
ch. 5, 2013 R.I. Pub. Laws 15; Act to Protect Religious Freedom and Recognize Equality in
Civil Marriage, no. 3, 2009 Vt. Acts & Resolves 3; Act of Feb. 13, 2012, ch. 3, 2012 Wash. Sess.
Laws 199 (ratified by voters, 2012); see also ME. SEC’Y OF STATE, MAINE CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO
THE REFERENDUM ELECTION 5-7 (2012) (detailing Referendum Question 1 on the Maine 2012
ballot); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-a, § 650-A (West 2012) (codifying Maine Referendum
Question 1).
17. 570 U.S. 693, 715 (2013).
18. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 750-52 (2013); see ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra
note 14, app. 1 at 755-71 (listing every state’s date for recognizing same-sex marriages).
19. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681-85 (2015) (listing, in an appendix, federal
courts’ constitutional decisions requiring marriage equality); Bill Chappell, Supreme Court
Declares Same Sex Marriage Legal in All 50 States, NPR (June 26, 2015, 10:05 AM), https://
www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/26/417717613/supreme-court-rules-all-states-must-
allow-same-sex-marriages [https://perma.cc/KEH4-H9R7].
20. Compare Timeline: Gay Marriage Chronology, L.A. TIMES (June 26, 2015), https://
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Several book-length treatments trace the path from Baehr to
Obergefell, including my recent book Marriage Equality: From
Outlaws to In-Laws, with Christopher Riano, which starts the story
in 1967.21 From Loving to Obergefell is forty-eight years, almost two
generations—so marriage equality certainly did not happen over-
night. But the issue did not have much salience until the 1990s, and
serious debate did not start until 2003, when the Supreme Court
decriminalized consensual sodomy in Lawrence v. Texas22 and the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court delivered Goodridge five
months later. Indeed, the twelve-year path from Lawrence to
Obergefell looks very similar to the thirteen-year path from Brown
v. Board of Education23 to Loving: responding to social movements,
the Supreme Court invalidated apartheid-like regimes (physical
separation of the races and emotional separation of sexual outlaws)
in the earlier decisions and then a decade later insisted on marriage
equality that had been taboo for generations.24
There are many differences, of course. The most salient is the
brutality and violence undergirding apartheid and the different-race
marriage bans—the foundation for the police brutality generating
the Black Lives Matter movement.25 Another difference is that when
the Supreme Court decided Loving, very few Americans believed
that different-race marriages were okay,26 but as early as 2011 most
graphics.latimes.com/usmap-gay-marriage-chronology/ [https://perma.cc/W5D8-WQN5]
(displaying each states’ marriage equality status in January 2015 and at other points in time),
with Map—The Leadup to Loving, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/other/map-leadup-loving
[https://perma.cc/3VD2-GT3U] (displaying a map of the remaining state miscegenation laws
that Loving overturned).
21. See ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note 14; see also NATHANIEL FRANK, AWAKENING: HOW
GAYS AND LESBIANS BROUGHT MARRIAGE EQUALITY TO AMERICA (2017).
22. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
24. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Original Meaning and Marriage Equality, 52 HOUS. L.
REV. 1067, 1088-1109 (2015).
25. See generally 50 Years Later, Interracial Couples Still Face Hostility from Strangers,
CBS NEWS (June 12, 2017, 10:40 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/50-years-loving-case-
interracial-couples-still-face-hostility-from-strangers/ [https://perma.cc/WA33-CQ5K];
Herstory, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/herstory/ [https://perma.cc/
UL5G-E2UU].
26. See Lydia Saad, Gallup Vault: Americans Slow to Back Interracial Marriage, GALLUP
(June 21, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/vault/212717/gallup-vault-americans-slow-back-
interracial-marriage.aspx [https://perma.cc/F9M5-UJ8B].
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Americans were okay with same-sex marriages.27 And that volte-
face came very rapidly for gay marriage. Though it was long opposed
by 2-1 majorities, more than 60 percent of the American people
supported marriage for same-sex couples in June 2015, when the
Supreme Court decided Obergefell.28 That is breathtaking speed.
Pollsters say they have seen nothing like it in the history of poll-
ing.29 The next Part will explain the remarkable success of marriage
equality.
II. SOCIETAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC EXPLANATIONS FOR
MARRIAGE EQUALITY
Leading litigation and lobbying organizations deserve a lot of
credit for securing nationwide marriage equality: Lambda Legal,
GLAD, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the National
Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR), Freedom to Marry, Gill Action,
the National LGBTQ Task Force, and the Human Rights Campaign
(HRC). Together with state and local groups (such as Love Makes a
Family in Connecticut, among dozens of others), these organizations
created a well-coordinated campaign that encouraged local public
relations and political networking campaigns, promoted impact
lawsuits in gay-friendly jurisdictions, publicized the advantages of
marriage equality in national and local media, developed in fits and
starts effective messaging strategies, and ultimately built an
27. See Ruth Marcus, The Good Politics of Gay Marriage, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-good-politics-of-gay-marriage/2011/12/08/
gIQA1yaifO_story.html [https://perma.cc/F37M-56GR].
28. Janet Hook, Support for Gay Marriage Hits All-Time High—WSJ/NBC News Poll,
WALLST.J.:WASH.WIRE (Mar. 9, 2015, 6:32 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/03/09/
support-for-gay-marriage-hits-all-time-high-wsjnbc-news-poll/ [https://perma.cc/9E3B-V745];
Justin McCarthy, Record-High 60% of Americans Support Same-Sex Marriage, GALLUP (May
19, 2015), https://news.gallup.com/poll/183272/record-high-americans-support-sex-marriage.
aspx [https://perma.cc/37GT-9J7H].
29. See Tanya Basu, Why More Americans Accept Gay Marriage Than Ever, ATLANTIC
(Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/why-more-americans-
accept-gay-marriage-than-ever/386707/ [https://perma.cc/K8K5-RE4F].
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unstoppable momentum.30 This account is accurate, but there is a
simpler story as well.
Gaining a foothold in Massachusetts assured widespread
acceptance for marriage equality, and the campaign to secure
marriage in New England was a roadmap for winning marriage
everywhere.31 While the “gayocracy”—the litigation and lobbying
organizations noted above, gay media and celebrities, leading ac-
ademics, and supportive business leaders and multimillionaires—
emphasized systematic national efforts, the seeds of success were
sown in Vermont by Beth Robinson, Susan Murray, and Mary
Bonauto.32 Their plan was a feminist grassroots campaign for an
idea they believed in. Each woman grew up in a culture that
disparaged women generally and demonized “homosexuals and
lesbians” in particular, each was inspired by feminist role models to
step outside existing culture and see themselves as worthy human
beings, and each knew that lesbians and gay men were just as
capable of family relationships as everyone else.33 For all of them,
the Baehr decision in Hawaii raised the possibility that states might
recognize those relationships—but not without a better-organized
campaign.34
After a series of meetings in Boston, Massachusetts and Ferris-
burg, Vermont, Murray, Robinson, and Bonauto became what they
termed “co-counsel for life,” with the goal to secure equal marriage
rights in Vermont, a relatively gay-friendly jurisdiction.35 Murray,
30. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note 14, chs. 3-4 (Lambda Legal), chs. 7-9 (GLAD),
ch. 11 (NCLR), ch. 13 (ACLU, Lambda, GLAD, NCLR, Task Force, Love Makes a Family), ch.
16 (Empire Pride, HRC, Freedom to Marry), ch. 18 (Task Force, Freedom to Marry, HRC), chs.
19-21 (GLAD, ACLU, Lambda Legal, NCLR); MARC SOLOMON, WINNING MARRIAGE: THE
INSIDE STORY OF HOW SAME-SEX COUPLES TOOK ON THE POLITICIANS AND PUNDITS—AND WON
79-83 (2015); Matt Coles, The Plan to Win Marriage, in LOVE UNITES US: WINNING THE
FREEDOM TO MARRY IN AMERICA 100, 101-07 (Kevin M. Cathcart & Leslie J. Gabel-Brett eds.,
2015) [hereinafter LOVE UNITES US]; Shannon Minter, California Dreaming: Winning
Marriage Equality in the California Courts, in LOVE UNITES US, supra, at 145, 146-49, 153;
Evan Wolfson with Adam Polaski, Movement + Strategy + Campaign: The Freedom to Marry
Winning Combination, in LOVE UNITES US, supra, at 108, 109-15, 117. 
31. See, e.g., Bonauto, supra note 10, at 23-29, 62-68.
32. For the account that follows, see id. at 23, and Mary L. Bonauto, The Litigation: First
Judicial Victories in Vermont, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, in LOVE UNITES US, supra
note 30, at 73, as well as ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note 14, at 171-226.
33. See ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note 14, at 171-226; Bonauto, supra note 10, at 2-8.
34. See Bonauto, supra note 32, at 73.
35. ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note 14, at 172-78.
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for example, had already helped persuade the Vermont Supreme
Court to recognize second-parent adoptions for lesbian and gay
couples and had orchestrated a grassroots political movement that
persuaded the legislature to codify that holding.36 On the marriage
issue, their plan was to find out what the small lesbian and gay
community wanted and needed, to build up a core of activists and
local support for a marriage conversation, to recruit allies in state
government and work hard to elect friends and unseat foes, to
explore potential support among religious and civic groups, and,
only after doing all that, to bring an impact lawsuit populated by
deeply committed and unthreatening couples.37 They almost won.
The Vermont Supreme Court surprised them with an opinion that
unanimously invalidated the exclusion of same-sex couples from
state family law but did not require marriage equality.38 In 2000,
the legislature enacted a law recognizing civil unions, with all the
rights, duties, and benefits accorded marriage under state law.39
The activists were deeply disappointed, but I celebrated their
achievement as “equality practice,” a giant step toward marriage
equality.40 Three years later, Bonauto and GLAD orchestrated an
impressive network of gay activists, religious leaders, lobbyists,
grassroots organizers, and civil libertarians to win marriage
equality in the Massachusetts marriage case and then protected it
against a constitutional referendum between 2003 and 2007.41
Goodridge was the “Cinderella moment” for marriage equality.
Statistician Nate Silver averaged the levels of polling support and
opposition from 1996 to 2013, as graphically depicted below.42 His
averages are revealing: support for marriage equality bumped up in
36. In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275-76 (Vt. 1993), codified by statute,
Adoption Act, no. 161, 1996 Vt. Acts & Resolves 262; see also ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note
14, at 171-76.
37. See ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note 14, at 171-79, 199-204.
38. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999). 
39. Act of Apr. 26, 2000, no. 91, 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 72.
40. WILLIAM N.ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE:CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY
RIGHTS 148 (2002). 
41. See Mary L. Bonauto, Equality and the Impossible—State Constitutions and Marriage,
68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1481, 1497-98, 1522 (2016).
42. Nate Silver, How Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage Is Changing, and What It Means,
N.Y. TIMES: FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 26, 2013, 10:10 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.blogs.ny
times.com/2013/03/26/how-opinion-on-same-sex-marriage-is-changing-and-what-it-means/
[https://perma.cc/3AHK-2QB5].
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the wake of the Defense of Marriage Act but then stagnated until
Massachusetts started issuing marriage licenses in 2004.43 Starting
in 2004, support for marriage equality continuously ticked up about
2 percent a year, until it passed the opposition numbers in 2011.44
Public support continued to climb every year between 2004 and
2009,45 even though no new state issued marriage licenses until
June 2008.46 During that period, most states in the country voted by
overwhelming margins for constitutional amendments banning
same-sex marriage and even civil unions from recognition in their
jurisdictions,47 yet popular support for marriage equality continued
to rise at the same steady pace.48
So the simplest—and most powerful—story of the triumph of
marriage equality is that winning a single state set in motion a
social and political ripple effect that made same-sex marriage across
the country possible in the short term and, in my view, inevitable in
the longer term. That national marriage equality came in 2015 was
the result of some lucky breaks, including the fact that Anthony
Kennedy, rather than Robert Bork, succeeded Lewis Powell on the




46. The state supreme court ruled that California had to extend marriage to same-sex
couples, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452 (Cal. 2008), and licenses were issued the
next month, see The Freedom to Marry in California, FREEDOM TO MARRY, http://www.freedom
tomarry.org/states/california [https://perma.cc/5GP9-NFHL]. Proposition 8 terminated that
process, see Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59 (Cal. 2009), until it was invalidated and
appeals exhausted on June 26, 2013, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 715 (2013).
47. See Bonauto, supra note 10, at 66.
48. Fig. 3.
49. Justice Bork would never have voted to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick, as Kennedy did
in Lawrence v. Texas. See Ethan Bronner, A Conservative Whose Supreme Court Bid Set the
Senate Afire, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/20/us/robert-h-
bork-conservative-jurist-dies-at-85.html [https://perma.cc/Q6BV-WU4G]. On the other hand,
Bork died in 2012, and if he had not resigned before 2007 (when the Democrats took the
Senate until 2015) he would have been replaced by a younger liberal Justice. See id.; Party
Division, U.S.SENATE,https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/4AFM-
5QSR]. Justice Kavanaugh, a conservative, now occupies the Bork-Kennedy seat. Tessa
Berenson, Inside Brett Kavanaugh’s First Term on the Supreme Court, TIME:LONGFORM (June
28, 2019, 11:46 AM), https://time.com/longform/brett-kavanaugh-supreme-court-first-term/
[https://perma.cc/5X8M-6D85].
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Figure 3. Silver’s Polling Averages on Marriage Equality, 
1996-2013
Source: Silver, supra note 42.
However the story is not quite that simple because there were
preconditions to the increasingly favorable public reception of the
Massachusetts beachhead. First, Goodridge would not have taken
the movement anywhere, or not very far, if there had not been
numerous lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, nonbinary, and other
Massachusettans who were ready to tie the knot. Natural variation
created a number of gender-nonconforming citizens for whom same-
sex relationships were desirable, but what was critically important
was the relative freedom those citizens felt to come out of the closet
not only as LGBTQ+ but also as gender-nonconforming couples who
wanted the public commitment that civil marriage offered.50 State
law facilitated the coming-out process by protecting them against
discrimination in the workplace, housing, public accommodations,
and credit.51 Many of those couples (including most of the seven
50. Cf. Wolfson & Polaski, supra note 30, at 115 (discussing the importance of visibility
in the context of winning public support for the freedom to marry).
51. Act of Nov. 15, 1989, ch. 516, 1989 Mass. Acts 796; see Peter M. Cicchino, Bruce R.
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plaintiff couples in Goodridge)52 were already rearing children
within their committed unions, and, for those couples, marriage was
a signal of commitment to their children as well as to one another.53
That Massachusetts had followed Vermont in recognizing second-
parent adoptions in 1993 was an important building block.54
Second, Goodridge would not have changed public opinion
anywhere if there had been demonstrably bad effects of marriage
equality, such as dramatic costs or burdens imposed on fellow
citizens. But when marriage was expanded to include sexual and
gender minorities, there were only a modest number of people who
suffered dignitary or family harms.55 Importantly, the institution of
marriage not only survived but flourished. Tens of thousands of
couples and their children were delighted to become marital
families, and these marriages proved to be as robust as those of
different-sex couples.56 There were enough marriage licenses to go
around.
In Goodridge, and in subsequent cases, the main argument
against marriage equality had been that it would change the social
meaning of marriage so much that the institution, in sharp de-
cline, would collapse altogether.57 Massachusetts was a good setting
to test that argument, as the marriage rate had steeply declined
Deming & Katherine M. Nicholson, Comment, Sex, Lies and Civil Rights: A Critical History
of the Massachusetts Gay Civil Rights Bill, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 549, 561 (1991). 
52. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003).
53. See, e.g., id.
54. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993). 
55. The most noted instances of harm were objections by some parents when schools
discussed same-sex marriages. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2008). Related
was the decision by Catholic Charities to cease adoption placements rather than comply with
the state antidiscrimination law. See U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
CATHOLIC ADOPTION SERVICES (2018), https://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-
liberty/upload/Discrimination-against-Catholic-adoption-services.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW6T-
LPCQ].
56. See Steven LeBlanc, Numbers Show How Gay Marriage Has Fared in Massachusetts,
MASSLIVE (Mar. 24, 2019), https://www.masslive.com/news/2015/06/numbers_show_how_gay_
marriage.html [https://perma.cc/4N3Q-7RXB] (observing that nearly twenty-six thousand gay
couples wed in the decade after Goodridge and that “Massachusetts has maintained one of the
lowest overall divorce rates of any state—both before and after gay marriage was legalized”).
See generally ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note 14, at 638-40, 724-28 (noting marriage in
Massachusetts and other states did fine in the wake of marriage equality).
57. See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 995-96 (Cordy, J., dissenting); Edward Stein, The
“Accidental Procreation” Argument for Withholding Legal Recognition for Same-Sex
Relationships, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 403 (2009). 
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before 2004,58 and so it was a test of the hypothesis that gay mar-
riage would simply finish off the declining institution. Yet that is
not what happened, as the table below reveals. Massachusetts’
marriage rates had fallen dramatically between 1990 and 2003,
from 7.9 marriages per 1000 persons to 5.6 marriages, a plunge of
29 percent.59 That was even greater than the steep decline in
national marriage rates, from 9.8 to 7.7.60 Goodridge coincided with
a reversal of that decline, in large part by adding more than six
thousand same-sex couples to the marriage rolls in 2004.61 But the
institution continued to do relatively well even after the initial
bounce. While the national marriage rate continued to erode after
Goodridge, the Massachusetts rate held relatively steady.62 Between
2016 and 2018, to my surprise, the Massachusetts marriage rate
increased, even as the national marriage rate continued to decline.63
58. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, MARRIAGE RATES BY STATE: 1990,
1995, AND 1999-2018, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/dvs/state-marriage-rates-90-95-99-18.
pdf [https://perma.cc/J3X9-2BE3] [hereinafter MARRIAGE RATES BY STATE].
59. Id.
60. SALLY C. CURTIN & PAUL D. SUTTON, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., MARRIAGE RATES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900-2018, at 4
(2020), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hestat/marriage_rate_2018/marriage_rate_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6D2S-BSU4].
61. See MARRIAGE RATES BY STATE, supra note 58; LeBlanc, supra note 56.
62. Compare MARRIAGE RATES BY STATE, supra note 58, with CURTIN & SUTTON, supra
note 60, at 4.
63. See MARRIAGE RATES BY STATE, supra note 58.
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Table 1. Massachusetts Marriage Rates, Compared with 





U.S. Marriage Rate Mass. Marriage Rate as % U.S. Rate
1990 7.9 9.8 78%
1995 7.1 8.9 79%
2000 5.8 8.2 71%
2001 6.2 8.2 76%
2002 5.9 8.0 75%
2003 5.6 7.7 73%
2004 6.5 7.8 83%
2005 6.2 7.6 82%
2006 5.9 7.5 80%
2007 5.8 7.3 80%
2008 5.6 7.1 79%
2009 5.6 6.8 82%
2010 5.5 6.8 82%
2011 5.5 6.8 82%
2012 5.5 6.8 82%
2013 5.5 6.8 82%
2014 5.6 6.9 81%
2015 5.5 6.9 80%
2016 5.8 7.0 83%
2017 5.7 6.9 83%
2018 6.3 6.5 97%
Source: MARRIAGE RATES BY STATE, supra note 58.
From these data, I would not—could not—argue that marriage
equality saved marriage or caused it to stabilize in the Bay State.
Yet I insist that the data do falsify the argument that marriage
equality would finish off a declining institution. The reason I
include the more recent data is that, when the sky did not fall in
Massachusetts, the “marriage will be dead” warnings took a hit, and
critics fell back on more abstract, long-term arguments.64 But the
64. See ESKRIDGE &RIANO, supra note 14, at 233-47 (tracing the evolution of the marriage
equality debate between 2004 and 2007).
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longer gay marriage has been normalized in Massachusetts, the
more stable the marriage numbers have been—a pattern replicated
in other states that accepted marriage equality early on.65 Again,
this is not conclusive proof but is decisive evidence against “the sky
is falling” criticisms of marriage equality.
Third, Goodridge would not have had a big effect on public
opinion if straight people had not been attentive to the many visible
benefits and few demonstrable harms of marriage equality.
Americans are not wild about changing cherished institutions, and
that inertia had been the death knell for marriage equality in the
1970s through the 1990s.66 But the mainstream “audience” for
marriage equality was increasingly receptive in the 2000s, both be-
cause they came to know LGBTQ+ couples, including freshly mar-
ried couples, and because they saw those marriages as not unlike
their own marriages or those of their parents. Especially in liberal
jurisdictions such as Massachusetts, Vermont, and Connecticut, the
gay community had changed in ways that affected public percep-
tions: all three states protected sexual minorities from job and other
forms of discrimination, Vermont and Connecticut provided domes-
tic partnership benefits to state employees, and all three states
allowed second-parent adoptions67—measures that brought gay
families out into the open. Just as LGBTQ+ families were revealing
themselves to be more like traditional married families, straight
families were becoming more like gender-nonconforming families:
many couples were unmarried, both partners worked outside the
home, and they were raising fewer children, often with the aid of
assisted reproductive technologies.68 The more knowledgeable
65. See tbl.1; ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note 14, app. 3 at 775-77.
66. Cf. Stein, supra note 57, at 410-11 (discussing common attitudes relating to
procreation and marriage rights that persisted from the 1970s through the 1990s and formed
an obstacle to marriage equality).
67. See GLAD: GLAD ANSWERS, MASSACHUSETTS: OVERVIEW OF LEGAL ISSUES FOR GAY
MEN, LESBIANS, BISEXUALS AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE 1, 23-24 (2018), http://www.glad.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ma-lgbt-overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZ5N-Z9UL]; GLAD:
GLAD ANSWERS, VERMONT: OVERVIEW OF LEGAL ISSUES FOR GAY MEN, LESBIANS, BISEXUALS
AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE 1, 27, 29 (2018), https://www.glad.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/
vt-lgbt-overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/D6E5-7DWP]; GLAD: GLAD ANSWERS, CONNECTICUT:
OVERVIEW OF LEGAL ISSUES FOR GAY MEN, LESBIANS, BISEXUALS AND TRANSGENDER PEOPLE
1, 26, 28 (2018), https://www.glad.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ct-lgbt-overview.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6WPJ-Y4MH].
68. See Stein, supra note 57, at 411.
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straight families were about gay families and the more alike they
were, the more open the straight audience was to the message that
such couples wanted the option of marriage for the same reasons
they did—love, commitment, and children.
So a social movement whose victory produces positive and indeed
heartwarming consequences for a visible and widely dispersed group
of beneficiaries (and here I include the parents, family, and friends
of LGBTQ+ married partners) and does no harm to other people or
to the community—that is a social movement that will have the
wind at its back. Before the court decisions in Hawaii, Vermont, and
Massachusetts, public decisionmakers were afraid to give gay
marriage any kind of legitimacy. It was “off the wall.” But after
Goodridge, things started breaking their way (though the losses
dominated the victories for several years): LGBTQ+ people em-
braced their identity in social, familial, and professional environ-
ments, which personalized the issue for the increasing numbers of
Americans who knew, worked with, and were related to gay people
and couples. Once that happened, purely moral arguments against
same-sex marriage (God does not approve, and these people do
disgusting things) became “off the wall” and had to be replaced by
“neutral” arguments based on the common good.69 However, those
common good, public policy arguments rang hollow when their
predictions were falsified and the media populated the headlines
with lesbian and gay couples with happy children.70
III. LESSONS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY FOR SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
LAW REFORM
The model for law reform inspired by social movements is the
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund’s litigation campaign
to invalidate American apartheid.71 The marriage equality campaign
69. See ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note 14, at 248-53, 256-62, 320-26.
70. See, e.g., Lindsey Bever, Children of Same-Sex Couples Are Happier and Healthier
Than Peers, Research Shows, WASH. POST (July 7, 2014, 5:48 AM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/07/07/children-of-same-sex-couples-are-happier-and-
healthier-than-peers-research-shows/ [https://perma.cc/2EQ3-MF28].
71. See generally JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE
SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND (2018); SERENA MAYERI,
REASONING FROM RACE:FEMINISM,LAW, AND THE CIVILRIGHTSREVOLUTION 2 (2011); RICHARD
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learned a great deal from that model, and the success of the latter
movement confirms and deepens many of the lessons learned from
the earlier movement, as well as from the social movements
supporting and opposing abortion choice.72 An overarching lesson is
this: because deeply held emotional commitments to the status quo
usually trump cognitive arguments and abstract appeals to equality
or justice, it is hard for a social movement to change public opinion
or generate big changes in law. A lot has to come together for big
changes to happen: favorable demographic and economic develop-
ments, mobilization of the group’s widely dispersed members who
agree that they are being treated unjustly, the recruitment of
unaffiliated allies, political organization at the local and national
levels, enormous funding to create smart, emotion-packed cam-
paigns and media attention, and a great deal of luck.73 Even at the
Supreme Court, whose members have life tenure, a social movement
often cannot win great constitutional victories, such as Brown v.
Board of Education, Roe v. Wade, and Obergefell v. Hodges without
the support of popular opinion, usually secured through a strate-
gically smart grassroots and media campaign addressed to a re-
ceptive socioeconomic climate.74
The foregoing points are the conventional wisdom, to which I
subscribe. Below I consider some other, less obvious lessons sug-
gested by these movements.
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (rev. ed. 2004); ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CON-
STITUTIONALISM:RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1994); Kimberlé Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidis-
crimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1364-65 (1988); William N. Eskridge Jr., Some Ef-
fects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100
MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2396-97 (2002); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality
Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1289 (1991). 
72. See generally MARY ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE LAW IN AMERICA:ROE V.WADE TO THE
PRESENT (2020); DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE
MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1994). 
73. See supra Part II.
74. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 13-15
(2009). See generally PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONALCONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily,
Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008).
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A. Lesson One: Intensity and Dispersion of Group
Even if it is just a minority of the population, a social group that
is both strongly motivated to change the law (because the law
affects their lives in harmful ways) and widely dispersed throughout
society is in the best position to succeed in law reform. From the
beginning of American apartheid regimes, Black Americans had
strong incentives to change the law but were successfully repressed
on the local level and had insufficient political traction at the
national level. The civil rights movement won some constitutional
victories notwithstanding their political marginalization, but an
important condition for ending American apartheid was Black
migration to the North and the rise of modest Black political power
that, for example, was critical to the elections of Harry Truman and
John F. Kennedy as presidents.75 Other racial and ethnic groups—
such as nineteenth-century Italian and Irish immigrants— encoun-
tered massive discrimination and ghettoization when they arrived,
only to achieve political influence through collective action and
gradual integration into local, and then national, politics.76
Marriage equality illustrates how a social group can emerge from
a new kind of ghetto (a psychic and normative one) through a
different process (“coming out of the closet”) but with similar
political dynamics: earning political traction, followed by strategi-
cally applying pressure on judicial, legislative, and executive
officials.77 For gay people, unlike for racial and ethnic minorities,
political visibility was an epistemic rather than geographic migra-
tion. (For all these minorities, political visibility was also normative:
we are not degraded, we are good human beings.) There have long
75. On the critical role of the Black vote in the 1948 election, see DAVID MCCULLOUGH,
TRUMAN 713 (1992) and JENNIFER SCANLON, UNTIL THERE IS JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF ANNA
ARNOLD HEDGEMAN 1-2 (2016), for an explanation of the key role of Hedgeman and other civil
rights activists in Truman’s election. On the critical role of the Black vote in the 1960 election,
see TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63, at 377-78
(1988) and James H. Meriwether, “Worth a Lot of Negro Votes”: Black Voters, Africa, and the
1960 Presidential Campaign, 95 J. AM. HIST. 737, 737-38 (2008). 
76. See, e.g., LINDA DOWLING ALMEIDA, IRISH IMMIGRANTS IN NEW YORK CITY, 1945-1995,
at 3 (2001); Stephen S. Hall, Italian-Americans Coming into Their Own, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(May 15, 1983), https://www.nytimes.com/1983/05/15/magazine/italian-americans-coming-into-
their-own.html [https://perma.cc/3GTT-ZH5M].
77. See Hall, supra note 76.
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been sexual and gender nonconformists, but they lived and engaged
in activities confined to the closet, a ghetto of secrecy and hiding.78
The big advances in LGBTQ+ rights have been occasioned by
increased numbers coming out of the closet as sexual and gender
nonconformists.79 What I call “pop-up homosexuals” were key to
ending the outlaw regime of Bowers v. Hardwick,80 and once many
came out of the closet as LGBTQ+ couples raising children in all
walks of life and all over America, marriage equality was possible
as well.81 On the eve of the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor, the
DOMA case, more Americans supported marriage equality than
opposed it.82 One-third of those who had changed their minds said
it was because someone close to them had come out as lesbian or
gay; almost a fifth said it was because they perceived that national
attitudes had changed.83
The closet can be a revolving door, however. I once believed that
the pro-choice stance on abortion would sweep the field because
women are both strongly affected by such laws and widely dispersed
in society, and because women (unlike LGBTQ+ persons) constitute
a majority of the voting public. So long as women substantially
and vocally agree on an issue, such as the illegitimacy of sexual
harassment, that issue has great political and judicial traction.84
But that has never been the case with abortion: there are about as
many women as men who are pro-life.85 Ironically, just as tens of
78. See Bonnie J. Morris, History of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Social
Movements, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N (2009), https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/history# [https://
perma.cc/6Z83-7KYM].
79. See ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note 14, at 5.
80. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
81. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note 14, at 662.
82. See Growing Support for Gay Marriage: Changed Minds and Changing Demographics,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 20, 2013), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2013/03/20/growing-
support-for-gay-marriage-changed-minds-and-changing-demographics/ [https://perma.cc/
9KEX-NDBC].
83. See id. See generally Daniel DellaPosta, Gay Acquaintanceship and Attitudes Toward
Homosexuality: A Conservative Test, SOCIUS, No. 4, 2018, at 1; Michael J. Rosenfeld, Moving
a Mountain: The Extraordinary Trajectory of Same-Sex Marriage Approval in the United
States, SOCIUS, No. 3, 2017, at 1.
84. See Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995,
1003 (2015). 
85. See “Pro-Choice” or “Pro-Life,” 2018-2019 Demographic Tables, GALLUP, https://news.
gallup.com/poll/244709/pro-choice-pro-life-2018-demographic-tables.aspx [https://perma.cc/
G263-R8R5].
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thousands of LGBTQ+ persons and couples were coming out of the
closet, women who had secured abortions retreated into their own
closets, and other women (including “Jane Roe”) were coming out
with stories of regretting their abortions.86 As Carol Sanger has
recently argued, the secrecy surrounding abortion decisions and the
people who make them is a key reason for the misunderstandings
and tensions surrounding this issue.87 As a result of the newly
closeted discourse, most Americans say they do not know a woman
who has had an abortion and believe that it is a very risky proce-
dure.88 The latter belief floors me: as a purely medical procedure,
abortion is much safer for women than childbirth.89
The recent constitutional politics of abortion have strongly
reflected this dynamic of coming out as both normative and public.
After losing their campaign to overrule Roe v. Wade in the 1990s,
leading pro-life organizations relied heavily on arguments that
abortion was bad for women’s physical and emotional health.90 Key
to that strategy were the stories popularized by “Operation Outcry,”
in which thousands of women like Norma McCorvey (“Jane Roe” in
Roe v. Wade) and Sandra Cano (the plaintiff in Doe v. Bolton) came
out of the closet as women who had secured abortions and regretted
them deeply.91 Conversely, pro-choice advocates and organizations
86. Norma Leah Nelson McCorvey (Jane Roe’s real name) was the plaintiff in Roe v. Wade,
then an abortion-regret speaker for the right to life, but at the end of her life she retracted her
pro-life positions and claimed that she had been a paid advocate for the pro-life narrative of
abortion regret. See AKA JANE ROE (Vice Studios et al. May 22, 2020) (movie containing her
deathbed confession).
87. CAROL SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION: TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN TWENTY-FIRST-
CENTURY AMERICA, at xi, 62-63 (2017); David E. Pozen, The Abortion Closet (with a Note on
Rules and Standards), 35 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 161, 163-64 (2017). 
88. See Sarah Kliff, We Polled 1,060 Americans About Abortion. This Is What They Got
Wrong., VOX (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.vox.com/a/abortion-statistics-opinions-2016/poll
[https://perma.cc/CU2D-YKUC].
89. See Genevra Pittman, Abortion Safer Than Giving Birth: Study, REUTERS (Jan. 23,
2012, 5:20 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-abortion/abortion-safer-than-giving-birth-
study-idUSTRE80M2BS20120123 [https://perma.cc/34VG-K4R9].
90. See ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 123, 143-45, 174-75.
91. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156-60 (2007) (relying on abortion-regret
stories and citing Brief of Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 22-24,
Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 1436684); Kathleen Cassidy, Post-Abortive
Women Attack Roe v. Wade, AT THE CENTER (Jan. 2001), https://www.atcmag.com/Issues/ID/
16/Post-Abortive-Women-Attack-Roe-v-Wade [https://perma.cc/L4MF-8QKN]; Reva B. Siegel,
The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion
Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1641-47 (2008).
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have called for more women to come out of the closet and talk openly
about how securing an abortion early in their lives was a positive
experience and enabled them to advance their lives and help their
families.92 The recent movement to “Shout Your Abortion” has
brought many pro-choice women out of the closet, while at the same
time provoking countervoices from women who are critical or
regretful.93 For the reproductive freedom movement to have success
on abortion issues, the marriage equality campaign suggests that
the movement’s leaders need a massive campaign of public educa-
tion and, more important, that its grassroots participants need to
come out of the abortion closet with their freedom-based stories.
B. Lesson Two: Freedom, Interest Convergence, and Unexpected
Messengers
Forty years ago, Derrick Bell maintained that Brown was in-
spired less by white people’s empathy with injustices faced by Black
people and more by “interest convergence.”94 During the Cold War,
it was no longer in the interest of white America to sustain an
apartheid system reviled almost everywhere else in the world.95 So
segregation by law was struck down, to great fanfare, while de facto
segregation survived, with less fanfare.96 The lesson: a government
cannot force people apart forever, but it is hard for the government
to force an unwilling majority to embrace and associate with a mi-
nority. Obergefell fits the interest convergence model: judges were
willing to stop the states from branding gay people as outlaws
92. See ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 196-97; SANGER, supra note 87, at 215-16; Katha
Pollitt, There’s a Reason Gay Marriage Is Winning, While Abortion Rights Are Losing, NATION
(Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/theres-reason-gay-marriage-win
ning-while-abortion-rights-are-losing/ [https://perma.cc/GHP7-CBGH].
93. See Abortion Is Normal. Our Stories Are Ours to Tell. This Is Not a Debate., SHOUT
YOUR ABORTION, https://shoutyourabortion.com/shrill/ [https://perma.cc/AJ5F-3PYR]; Tamar
Lewin, #ShoutYourAbortion Gets Angry Shouts Back, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/10/02/us/hashtag-campaign-twitter-abortion.html [https://perma.cc/4DWQ-
6Z7L] (describing the origins of #ShoutYourAbortion and responses by countertweeters). 
94. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1980).
95. See id.; Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
149, 150-51 (2011). 
96. See generally How Segregation Survived, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, https://segregation
inamerica.eji.org/report/how-segregation-survived.html [https://perma.cc/Q47J-P6BT].
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before they were willing to embrace them as potential in-laws,
because many “tolerant” people wanted to keep gays at arm’s
length. A bare majority of the Court delivered marriage rights to
gay people only after straight people changed their minds about
gays in the family and saw it as in their interest to expand mar-
riage.97
But notice that the Supreme Court’s opinion did not exactly
confirm “marriage equality” so much as a “freedom to marry” for
sexual and gender minorities.98 To the extent that a social move-
ment can persuade mainstream Americans that its members are
being denied basic freedoms, its message will be successful—and
likely much more successful than if the movement relies on the
rhetoric of equal protection.99 Brown and Loving—the twin pillars
of the constitutional legacy of the civil rights movement—were both
freedom cases: Topeka told white as well as Black parents that their
children could not go to the same schools,100 and Virginia told the
Lovings they were criminals because they were lawfully married in
the District and dared to move back to Caroline County.101 Overstat-
ing just a little, so long as the marriage movement’s tag line was
“marriage equality,” it was annihilated at the polls—but when sup-
porters substituted “freedom to marry” in the November 2012 ballot
initiatives, the social movement swept the field.102 That rhetorical
shift was also reflected in the Kennedy opinion for Obergefell.103
Perhaps learning from this successful strategy, in the wake of
Obergefell critics of marriage equality have scored legal victories
when they have brought sympathetic plaintiffs—wedding vendors
and religious adoption services—to complain that the state was
97. See PROTEUS FUND, HEARTS&MINDS:THE UNTOLD STORY OF HOW PHILANTHROPY AND
THE CIVIL MARRIAGE COLLABORATIVE HELPED AMERICA EMBRACEMARRIAGE EQUALITY 2-3, 12-
13, 16 (2015). 
98. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 666 (2015).
99. See ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note 14, at 493-94, 511.
100. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486-88 (1954).
101. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1967).
102. See, e.g., GRASSROOTS SOLUTIONS, “CONVERSATION CAMPAIGN” CREATES PATH TO
VICTORY 3 (2013) (describing a shift in messaging to emphasize “love, commitment, and
personal freedom” and a subsequent marriage equality victory at the Minnesota polls); see
also ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note 14, at 493-94, 511.
103. See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 665-67.
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denying their freedom to follow the dictates of conscience.104 Live
and let live.
In the current abortion debate, most Americans support Roe v.
Wade because they do not think the government should take away
a woman’s right to choose and are nervous about allowing the state
to interfere in doctor-patient relationships.105 Pro-life groups tend to
lose cases when they deny pregnant women the freedom to choose
and doctors the freedom to help them.106 They tend to win cases
when they focus on the liberty interests of parents, religious
providers of medical services or health insurance, and pregnant
women themselves; for pregnant women in particular, such liberty
interests have included disclosures that facilitate what the state
considers “informed consent” and, nowadays, to abortion clinics that
have medical credentials deemed important by the state.107
A corollary of interest convergence theory is that constitutional
changes that ostensibly redistribute rights, power, or resources away
from mainstream Americans face a huge uphill climb.108 So long as
straight Americans believed that “gay marriage” would hurt them
as parents or as church members, they were strongly opposed; only
after some of these folks reconsidered their view that they were
losing something did the freedom to marry gain ascendancy.109
Similarly, affirmative action that is perceived as redistributing jobs,
benefits, and power to persons of color is politically toxic and now
constitutionally suspect—but the majority can be persuaded to
104. See, e.g., Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Rules for Colorado Baker in Same-Sex
Wedding Cake Case, CNN (June 4, 2018, 5:01 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/04/politics/
masterpiece-colorado-gay-marriage-cake-supreme-court/index.html [https://perma.cc/59HP-
XMRH].
105. See Roe v. Wade: The Constitutional Right to Access Safe, Legal Abortion, PLANNED
PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/issues/abortion/roe-v-wade [https://
perma.cc/Y9QK-GPSQ].
106. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992).
107. See ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 93-94, 114, 116-17, 192-96; Douglas NeJaime & Reva
B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124
YALE L.J. 2516, 2539-40 (2015). For examples of successful freedom-based arguments for pro-
life organizations, see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014), in which the
Court found in favor of religious liberty claims, and Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v.
Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734-36 (8th Cir. 2008), for a decision upholding aggressive informed
consent law. 
108. See Bell, supra note 94, at 522-23.
109. See ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note 14, at 647.
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accept “diversity” if needed to make institutions (such as the police,
firefighters, the armed forces, or universities) work better.110
Likewise, in the abortion debate, equality arguments have had a
double edge. Obviously, rules prohibiting or limiting abortion choice
discriminate against women as a class, but constitutional strategies
emphasizing sex discrimination and unfairness to women highlight
the perception (some argue fact) that men are losing rights, power,
or decision-making input.111
To be successful in actually changing the law, the social move-
ment needs to persuade mainstream Americans that they are not
losing anything significant. A corollary of this lesson is one that
freedom-to-marry strategists deployed in state campaigns: “unex-
pected messengers,” namely older, traditionally married straight
couples recounting their journey from disbelief or skepticism to-
ward acceptance and even enthusiasm for their daughter or close
friend to have the choice to marry her beloved.112 The more sur-
prising the messenger, the more effective the journey story. I viewed
dozens of ads and videos created for the 2012 ballot campaigns,
and the most compelling was “Kriesel,” which helped freedom to
marry defeat a constitutional amendment in Minnesota.113 A con-
servative Republican, Representative John M. Kriesel, was a
veteran whose speech to fellow legislators endorsed same-sex
marriage because a fellow Minnesotan had been the first openly gay
soldier to die in combat.114 Corporal Wilfahrt died to save his
colleague, and Kriesel, a fellow combat officer, could not say
Wilfahrt did not have the right to marry.115
110. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003).
111. Cf. Juliana Menasce Horowitz & Ruth Igielnik, A Century After Women Gained the
Right To Vote, Majority of Americans See Work to Do on Gender Equality, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(July 7, 2020), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2020/07/07/a-century-after-women-gained-the-
right-to-vote-majority-of-americans-see-work-to-do-on-gender-equality/ [https://perma.cc/
8AL6-6BD9].
112. See ESKRIDGE & RIANO, supra note 14, at 487.
113. See Sasha Aslanian & Eric Ringham, Eighteen Months to History: How the Minnesota
Marriage Amendment Was Defeated—Money, Passion, Allies, MPR NEWS (Nov. 9, 2012, 6:30
PM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2012/11/09/marriage-how [https://perma.cc/5DKF-
9WUR].
114. See Michael McIntee, Rep. Kriesel’s Full Speech on Gay Marriage, Bucking the GOP,
YOUTUBE (May 22, 2011), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0WyYRA4aZSI [https://perma.
cc/WHS6-JNDV].
115. See id.
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In a similar spirit, Katha Pollitt suggests that pro-choice
campaigns need to persuade putative fathers, grandparents, uncles,
and brothers that the whole family is harmed when women are
denied the freedom to control their own bodies.116 And those men
need to speak out—not only about why it is important to them that
their wives, daughters, nieces, and sisters are denied needed
freedom, but also about why it is bad for families in general and
men in particular.117
C. Lesson Three: The Hydraulics of Prejudice and Stereotypes
A final lesson is tentative, disturbing, but potentially important:
what we have learned from all these social movements, including
marriage equality, is that private prejudice and stereotyping are
slower to change than public rhetoric and legal rights. Decades ago,
Charles Lawrence introduced the legal literature to the concept of
“unconscious racism,” the notion that even people who consciously
and even enthusiastically support diversity and equal rights
typically harbor unconscious racist tropes that affect their actions.118
Implicit bias explains how a culture that explicitly rejects racism
and supports nondiscrimination and integration can also generate
brutal police action against Black persons at seven times the rate
against white persons.119 The murder of George Floyd that set off
weeks of protests120 is only the tip of the racist iceberg more than
two-thirds of a century after Brown.
Theorists such as Elisabeth Young-Bruehl suggest an explana-
tion: prejudice and stereotyping serve the emotional needs of many
people, and different neuroses can be associated with different
116. See Pollitt, supra note 92.
117. See id.
118. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987); see also Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Comment, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016, 1016-17
(1988); Lincoln Quillian, Does Unconscious Racism Exist?, 71 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 6, 7 (2008)
(finding that unconscious racism does exist).
119. See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Lazaro Gamio, Minneapolis Police Use Force Against Black
People at 7 Times the Rate of Whites, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2020/06/03/us/minneapolis-police-use-of-force.html [https://perma.cc/SFJ3-A8ZW].
120. See id.
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prejudices.121 Thus, the racist and the homophobe, contrary to
liberal thinking, are not dysfunctional, drooling idiots. Not only are
they functional people but their hysteria in dealing with “dirty”
sexual feelings that they have is often ameliorated by displacing
their hysterical emotions onto a polluted other group, such as
Blacks or LGBTQ+ people.122
What that means for law is that great constitutional victories
such as Brown, Roe, and Obergefell will not, on their own, stamp out
prejudice; and even conscious efforts to respect and enforce equal
rights will often be undermined by actions that are driven by
unconsciously biased motivations. This reality underwrites the
famous public-private distinction in American constitutionalism:
even the most determined constitutional egalitarian allows
discrimination in private sanctuaries—the home and the family, the
church and the synagogue, the Boy Scouts—because the law cannot
reach those sanctuaries at a reasonable cost and because the
backlash would threaten the rule of law itself.123
Just as Brown and Roe initiated rather than ended a consti-
tutional conversation, so Obergefell was not the final word on the
status of LGBTQ+ people in American society, nor was it even the
final word on marriage equality. States like Texas still defy the
Obergefell holding that same-sex married couples must be treated
the same by the state as different-sex married couples.124 Five years
after Obergefell, Justices Thomas and Alito recently objected to the
Court’s “undemocratic” and “atextual” constitutional reasoning
and lamented the pervasive loss of “religious liberty.”125 They om-
inously suggested that the majority had created a “problem” that
only a new majority could “fix.”126
121. See ELISABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, THE ANATOMY OF PREJUDICES 27 (1996). 
122. See id. at 33-35.
123. See Larry Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutional Limits on
Private Power, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 361, 367-68 (1993).
124. Pidgeon v. Turner, 538 S.W.3d 73 (Tex. 2017) (reversing trial court judgment
upholding requirement that spousal benefits programs for government workers include same-
sex married couples).
125. Davis v. Ermold, 141 S. Ct. 3 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).
126. Id. All three of the post-Obergefell Justices adhere to “original public meaning.” See,
e.g., Ian Millhiser, Originalism, Amy Coney Barrett’s Approach to the Constitution, Explained,
VOX (Oct. 12, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/21497317/originalism-amy-coney-barrett-
constitution-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/3NBW-F5XD] (“Originalism, in Barrett’s words,
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* * * 
Social movement campaigns for equal treatment and freedoms for
traditionally disparaged groups never end. Robust social movements
are discouraged by constitutional rebuffs like Bowers v. Hardwick
and emboldened by landmark constitutional victories such as
Obergefell v. Hodges—but neither rebuffs nor victories terminate the
social, political, or even legal debates over the status of those
groups. How well a social group does in the arenas of public opinion
and the judiciary depends critically on how well its members and
leaders adapt to the evolving debate. That is the ultimate takeaway
from marriage equality’s deceptively swift constitutional triumph,
and it is a lesson that the participants in reproductive freedom and
affirmative action debates would do well to internalize.
is the belief that ‘constitutional text means what it did at the time it was ratified and that this
original public meaning is authoritative.’”). Although I have demonstrated that the original
public meaning of the Equal Protection Clause supported marriage equality, see Eskridge,
supra note 24, I doubt that any of the three new Justices would have voted that way in
Obergefell.
